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ABSTRACT
The present paper aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology
(ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social
cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive and dynamic process (Semin &
Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism)
claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a
continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist
accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999;
2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach, that construes embodiment in terms
of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that
mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by
going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today.

Keywords: Social Psychology, Situated Embodied Cognitive Science, Enactivism, Perceptual
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1. Introduction
The past decades Situated and Embodied Cognitive Science (hereon
Situated/Embodied Cognition) has become increasingly influential in psychology and
philosophy of mind. Briefly, it holds that the mind is inherently determined and structured by
the body and the environment, or in a more radical version, that the mind extends over the
body and the environment (for overviews see Clark, 2008; Shapiro, 2011). Situated/Embodied
Cognition implies a break with longstanding assumptions within classic cognitive science
(hereafter Cognitivism), most notably the mind as essentially a stand-alone system, running
on (sub)symbolic representations decoupled from current states of the agent’s body and her
environment (De Bruin & Kästner, 2011).
The rejection of representations in explaining intelligent behavior is a common thread
in Ecological Psychology (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Richardson, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, &
Turvey, 2008) and Enactivism (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Thompson, 2007; Varela,
Thompson & Rosch, 1991). These approaches assert that if the mind is properly understood as
embodied and situated, the object of investigation is a coupled brain-body-world system that
has no (or minor) need for decoupled control systems, i.e. mental representations (Chemero,
2009; Hutto & Myin, 2013). Challenging static and individualistic conceptions of (social)
cognition, radically Situated/Embodied approaches emphasize emergent patterns of
interaction between organism and environment.
The subject of this paper is how different approaches and ideas in Situated/Embodied
Cognition relate to the field of Social Psychology. Whereas smooth dyadic interaction
between two agents fits the interactive and emergent picture that Situated/Embodied
Cognition proposes, mainstream accounts within Social Psychology emphasize embodied
simulation, where reenactment, the activation of a sensori-motor representation is assumed to
constitute understanding of the other’s intentions. This is not quite the same as on-line
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interaction: the embodied simulation account puts the cognitive agent’s neural reenactments
of internal perceptuo-motor routines central rather than a genuine dyadic and dynamic
interactive process.
In the extensive literature on embodiment in Social Psychology (Niedenthal, Barsalou,
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012; Semin &
Smith, 2002, 2008, 2013), there seems to have been little interest in the potential role of
radically situated/embodied cognition (besides some notable exceptions, see Marsh, Johnston,
Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009). Semin and Smith (2013), who have written extensively on the
applications of Situated/Embodied Cognition for Social Psychology, raised similar concerns
about the narrow coverage of embodiment. They point out that social cognition is intrinsically
situated, distributed and emergent; it is a function of dyads, groups and social networks, not of
lone thinkers (p. 139). Yet, although Semin and Smith (2013) seem to be sympathetic towards
a more dynamic and interactive perspective on social cognition, they do not seem to realize
the full theoretical consequences of such a perspective (cf. Schilbach, 2013). As we will show
below (section 3), the notion of embodiment in Social Psychology is usually construed in a
rather narrow way, and remains close to traditional representationalist views (Section 3), as
decoupled from the environment (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2005).
1.1 Goals & Overview
The aim of the current paper is to provide a broad contrast of Radical
Situated/Embodied approaches with the popular embodied perspective in Social Psychology.
We firstly introduce the philosophical ideas that resonate with either Cognitivism or
Situated/Embodied Cognition. This introduction should provide us with a broader picture
wherein Cognitivism and Situated/Embodied Cognition do not fundamentally stem from rival
and directly testable theories, but rather from differing philosophical worldviews (Van Dijk,
Kerkhofs, Van Rooij, & Haselager, 2008). In section 3, we provide a theoretical introduction
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of the Embodied Simulation approach (most notably Barsalou’s [1999, 2008] Perceptual
Symbol Systems account) and show how this approach can be philosophically positioned, as
compared to Radical Situated/Embodied Cognition, such as Ecological Psychology and
Enactivism (Section 4). We will conclude that there is room and necessity for broadening the
theoretical foundations of Social Psychology.
2. Philosophical worldviews in cognitive science
An account of the philosophical roots of Situated/Embodied Cognition can only be
selective and simplified (for a broad overview see Gallagher, 2009). Historically, MerleauPonty’s (1962) Phenomenology of perception is among the sources of Embodied Cognition,
and more recently, theorists like Clark (1997); Dreyfus (1972); Varela, Thompson and Rosch
(1991). We offer two (simplified and perhaps extreme) sets of fundamental assumptions and
insights, each linked with the theories outlined in upcoming sections. Our (secondary) sources
are neo-phenomenologists and neo-Heideggerians like Wheeler (2007), Ratcliffe (2007), and
Gallagher (2005, 2009). For the sake of brevity we will refer to the sources of Cognitivist
worldviews in philosophy as Cartesian, and the sources of Situated/Embodied Cognition as
Heideggerian.
2.1. Cartesian ideas in psychology
Cognitivism has often been characterized as sharing many assumptions that align with
René Descartes’ (1596-1650) view (hereon Cartesian view) on the relation between mind and
world (e.g., Semin & Smith, 2002; Glenberg, 2006). Cognitivism has dismissed the original
Cartesian dualism between the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa) but it still
accepts his dualism of the mind and world, subject and object (Wheeler, 2007). It is the
assumption that the epistemic situation of a cognizing agent is one in which there is an
objective pre-given world on the one side and the subject’s model of it on the other: the mind
mirrors the world (Rorty, 1979). This involves the notion of representations. Representations
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are constructed by enriching, and inferring information from, otherwise meaningless and
underdetermined sensory stimuli. Thus the Cartesian Psychologist “postulate[s] the existence
of systematically organized, (ultimately) neural inner states whose functional role is to stand
in for (usually external) objects and situations…” (Wheeler, 2007, p.58).
Another Cartesian assumption of Cognitivism is that intelligent behavior can be
broken up into smaller cognitive modules. A general pattern that unfolds in individuating
these modules is one of sense-represent-plan-move cycles (Wheeler, 2007). This proposed
serial process implies that intelligent behavior unfolds by decoupling perception and action.
Lower-order modules (perception and action) are only indirectly connected through mediation
of higher-order modules (representing and planning). Moreover, the Cartesian Psychologist
would conceive behavior in which perception and action are directly coupled without the
intermediate control of higher-order modules either impossible, unintelligent or
problematically inflexible (e.g., instinctive behavior, reflexes etc.). Thus “the bulk of
intelligent human action is the outcome of general-purpose [higher-order] reasoning
processes” that a) retrieve the relevant representations given the current behavioral context
and b) manipulates, combines and transforms these representations appropriately as to
determine what to do (Wheeler, 2007, p. 76). Evidently, the agent’s situatedness is downplayed in the above understanding of intelligent behavior; higher order reasoning mechanisms
that draw on reconstructed representations of that situation prevail. The role of the non-neural
body and the environment are only relevant insofar as they are neurally represented.
The Cartesian assumption regarding social cognition is that the mind is inherently a
subjective domain – a mind inhabited with decoupled and private representations. From it
emerges the well-known ‘problem of other minds’ which means that the human agent can
never definitively know whether other human agents have experiences just like her. It is
therefore held that behaviors of others are intentionally opaque since the representational
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states (e.g., intentions, beliefs, desires) from which (social) actions supposedly spring are
tucked away in the body (Gallagher, 2005). The Cartesian is therefore left with the project of
investigating how people come to represent the contents of other minds. This takes the form
of employing a representational mechanism which allows for the modeling of others’ mental
states. For example, according to the ‘Theory Theory’ (e.g., Leslie, Friedman, & German,
2004) when perceiving another’s behavior one can attribute a mental state onto the other (e.g.,
emotions, beliefs, desires) by using mentally represented propositional attitudes which are
either learned or the product of an innate mechanism. These scripts are constantly changed on
the basis of the success of the inference in social practices. In contrast ‘Simulation Theory’
denies that humans employ such a theory since we can model others’ mental states on the
basis of our own (e.g., Heal, 1986; Goldman, 1989).Although variations of both theories
differ on whether these inferential processes need to be conscious, they share the Cartesian
project of postulating the existence of mental representations of others’ mental states (for an
overview see Ratcliffe, 2007).
2.2 Heideggerian insights
Having briefly sketched out the philosophical assumptions in Cartesian Psychology we
now turn to one of the philosophical sources of Situated/Embodied Cognition. Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976) is mentioned across several sources in this context (e.g., Niedenthal et
al., 2005, p.186; Semin & Smith, 2001, p. 236; Wheeler, 2007).
Martin Heidegger’s work is rooted in the philosophical tradition of Phenomenology
which takes as its object of inquiry the structure of experience or consciousness. One of the
primary concerns of Heidegger in Being and Time (1962) is the meaning of Being. Heidegger
believes that an appropriate step in understanding the meaning of Being is to turn to human
phenomenal experience; after all humans have an implicit grasp of what it means for things to
be. Heidegger asserts that if we turn to experience, we primarily find ourselves in a world,
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rather than viewing the world from a detached standpoint as the Cartesian subject-object
distinction implies1.
Heidegger does acknowledge that entities can be encountered from a detached – and in
some sense Cartesian - standpoint (which he terms encountering entities as ‘present-at-hand’).
For example (not Heidegger’s), if I take the time and stop my activity of typing and look at
my keyboard, I can contemplate the shapes on the board and all its attributes - which surely
follows the Cartesian view of a subject pitted against the object. However, we generally do
not encounter things in such an intellectual and theoretical way. Rather, things are
encountered as usable, affording possibilities for action in the context of ongoing activity.
Heidegger terms this way of relating to entities as ‘ready-to-hand’, so as to emphasize that we
always have our hands in it (Ratcliffe, 2007).
Heidegger emphasizes the significance of the phenomenal structure of everyday
common-sense situations where we are not thinking but acting. The intelligent agent becomes
unreflectively absorbed and merges with the entities that are manipulated in ongoing activity.
This particular structure of awareness which negates the experience of the subject-object
contrast to a radical extent, is what Heiddeger terms circumspection (Wheeler, 2007). In stark
opposition, the Cartesian subject-object, and mind-world dichotomy implies that epistemic
access to the world can only be gained through world-mirroring mental representations.
Circumspection, in which the agent relates to entities as ready-to-hand, particularly arises in
hitch-free active engagement. Wheeler (2007) gives it the term smooth coping; an active
engagement of the agent in the world, occurring in a real-time interaction with the
environment, and relying on fluid context-specific responses (Wheeler, 2007). Smooth coping
involves a particular kind of knowledge. Whereas the Cartesian kind of epistemic access is
1

For this reason Heidegger avoided the traditional conception of the subject in his analysis of
the understanding of being - redescribing an intelligent agent as a there-being, a Dasein.
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detached registering which yields a propositional general reason-based knowing-that, the
Heideggerian agent primarily relies on a more practical knowing-how constituted in an
ongoing dynamic body-world interaction (i.e., smooth coping). Indeed, it is Heidegger’s
emphasis on the human agent as actively involved with the environment that motivates the
appreciation of extra-neural factors (which can be bodily, equipmental, or social) which
“reveal themselves to be the unexpected root of the very adaptive flexibility and richness that
is normally attributed to representation-based control” (Wheeler, 2001, pp. 217-218).
As mentioned above, Heidegger does leave room for encountering entities in a more
detached present-at-hand way. Then, our mode of relating to the world undergoes a
phenomenological shift, where we lose our unreflective grip on the situation, where entities
light up as objects (Wheeler, 2007, Chapter 5). This is a step towards the theoretical Cartesian
attitude, although it is still the case that these are according to Heidegger encountered in the
context of that activity, not as fully context-free objects but as what Wheeler (2007) terms
“practical objects”. Indeed, Heidegger stresses that even in situations where unreflective
smooth coping is absent or is disrupted, are we always already in a world of practical
significance (Heidegger, 1962). The important epistemological implication is that the
epistemic mode of practical smooth coping is primary, and that the objective theoretical mode
is derived.
How is the Heideggerian view related further to social cognition? In the Cartesian
view, the agent relates himself to the other by simulating, modeling or inferring other’s
mental states from the underspecified perceptual stimulus (the other). In the Heideggerian
view, the agent becomes attuned to others in pragmatic situated contexts. As Gallagher &
Jacobson (2012) state about the Heideggerian view of Social Cognition:

Running Head: RETHINKING SITUATED & EMBODIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

10

We encounter them [the other] as agents already engaged with us in a meaningful
project. Their meanings and our understanding of them are directly tied to the
instrumental or social situation in which we encounter them. In normal unproblematic
circumstances there is no further mystery, nothing extra hidden away that we need to
theorize about. Nor do we require a simulation process to bridge a gap between
ourselves and others, since in everyday life we are them (original emphasis, p.217).

The claim here is that social interaction (primarily) operates on a social (e.g., dyadic)
level that cannot be reduced to individual analysis (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010).
We will discuss below how this resonates with radically situated/embodied appeals for
considering the cognitive system as a constitutively open wherein its components can spread
beyond the individual and include the environment (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Riley,
Richardson, Shockley, & Ramenzoni, 2011). As we will see, in Radical Situated/Embodied
Cognition the question is how social agents interact in rather than construct representations of
the social environment. In the next sections we shall further explore how these Heideggerian
ideas carry over to todays situated and embodied approaches of social cognition.
3. Embodied Simulation
3.1 Perceptual Symbol Systems: Embodied Cognition and the grounding problem
In this section we will discuss the basic framework what we have called the Embodied
Simulation account, focusing on Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol Systems account of cognition
(PSS; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2005) and to a lesser extent on related
perspectives (e.g., Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).
Arguably, Barsalou’s PSS account became popular in the discourse as a
situated/embodied perspective in Social Psychology since it provided an account of how
social stimuli affected the body (e.g., mimicry) and how bodily states produced cognitive and
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affective states (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2005). Furthermore these findings
seemed to provide a solution for the so-called symbol grounding problem as introduced by
Searle (1980) and elaborated by Harnad (1990). The problem is that symbolic mental
representations, as posited by Cognitivism, are unable to acquire meaning since symbolic
codes are arbitrarily related to their perceptual referents (just like the word “dog” is an
arbitrary symbol for the concept of a dog). In Cognitivism it is theorized that the symbols
(e.g., dog) re-acquire their meaning from the network of symbols they are part of (e.g.,
mammal, pet; Block, 1995). However the problem posed by Harnad (1990) remains: symbols
cannot acquire meaning by sheer reference to other meaningless symbols.
Barsalou (1999, 2008) aims to resolve the symbol grounding problem by further
elaborating on the Empiricist notion that knowledge (or thought) is derived from (correlates
of) perception. In the PSS account the knowledge of for example the concept dog is grounded
in previous experiences with dogs. As such thinking about a dog, or recognizing a dog, relies
on reactivations of neural patterns in multiple modalities (e.g., auditory system, visual system
etc.) that were activated during previous encounters with dogs. These modality-specific
activation patterns are bound by higher-order-cross-modal associations that establish a
multimodal representation, a Perceptual Symbol. These perceptual symbols are equivalent to
Damasio’s convergence zones which consist of hierarchically structured conjunctive neurons
that interconnect different modality-specific information (Damasio, 1989). Importantly, these
simulation processes primarily operate on a sub-personal level but may be mediated and
accessed by consciousness (Barsalou, 1999, 2008).
Whereas Cognitivism proposes abstract and formal symbol structures that are
transduced and recoded, and thus amodal, i.e., no longer coded as sensory modalities, in the
PSS account representations are always perceptual or embodied (Barsalou, 1999). Therefore,
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no grounding problem should arise since there are no arbitrary relations between concepts and
their referents (see however Shapiro, 2010).
The PSS account further employs the important notion of situated conceptualization
which can be viewed as “an agent-dependent instruction manual that delivers specialized
packages of inferences to guide an agent’s interactions with particular category members in
specific situations” (Barsalou, 2005, p.626). Further building on this proposal, Glenberg &
Kaschak (2002) suggest that this simulation process offers a way to derive affordances
(possibilities for actions) in the sense of Gibson (1979). Barsalou (2009) further elaborates
how situated conceptualization processes relate to experience:

Situated conceptualizations place the conceptualizer directly in the respective
situations, creating the experience of “being there”. By reenacting an agent’s actions
and introspective states […] the situation is not represented as detached and separate
from the conceptualizer (p. 672).

As such, situated conceptualization aims to explain how the human agent intelligently
relates to and acts in the situation at hand (Barsalou, 2009). According to the PSS account,
when a modality-specific component of a stored situation is activated, situated
conceptualization offers the agent a way of filling in the remaining pattern of this situation by
simulations of non-observed components. Such a process supposedly allows the agent to
anticipate for certain not-yet observed components of the situation as well as to intelligently
(re)act given the experience that she has had in similar situations.
3.2 The Embodied Simulation Account of Social Cognition
In the PSS account sensori-motor states are coupled to the representational system.
Namely, actual body states can interfere or moderate simulations that are recruited during
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situated conceptualizations. For example, people are quicker (slower) in verifying the
sensibility of sentences (such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you vs. You delivered the pizza
to Andy”) when their response actions complemented (contrasted) the implied motion of the
sentences (backward vs. forward hand-movement; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Furthermore,
bodily states can offer possibilities for inference such that somatic (e.g., elevated heart rate)
and motor responses (e.g., stepping back in a conversation) influence the interpretation of a
situation (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Another way that actual sensori-motor states are coupled to
cognitive activity is when simulations trigger actual executions such that for example motorsimulations “leak into” the motor-system (such as in the case of hand-gestures; Hotstetter &
Alibali, 2008). Yet, Barsalou (2008) states “Bodily states are not necessary for cognitive
activity, although they can be closely related to it” (p. 620). Unfortunately, the PSS account is
far from clear when and why bodily states contribute anything over and above the simulation
process: “On some occasions, actions may only be simulated. On others, actions may be
simulated with only traces appearing in behavior—not full-blown execution. On still other
occasions, simulations may trigger full execution of the respective actions” (Barsalou et al.,
2003, p.77).
Recently, the discovery of mirror-neurons in monkeys and humans has been connected
with the notion of sensori-motor representations in developing an alternative model of basic
interpersonal understanding, called the Embodied Simulation account (Gallese & Sinigaglia,
2011; cf. Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). According to this account, much like the classic
Simulation Theory (ST; Heal, 1979), an agent can understand others by reusing one’s own
mental states in order to understand the other. The embodied simulation account of social
cognition suggests that the simulation process relies on the activation of neural substrates that
resonate to perceived bodily actions of the other. The key mechanism in such a process is the
Mirror Neuron System (MNS). The MNS has both perceptual and motor properties which
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enable the agent to match actions performed with actions perceived. As such the MNS
provides a basis on which implicit simulation processes can be scaffolded such that agents are
able to “retrodict the targets mental states, moving backwards from the observed action”
(Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). For example there are mirror neurons that fire when a target
object is grasped, as well as perceived to be grasped by another agent (for an overview see
Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). Furthermore, some mirror neurons resonate to a goal (such as
reaching for a peanut), not just a motor movement (e.g., the sight and the sound of cracking
peanuts evoke the same response). Thus this account assumes that interpersonal
understanding is a process of embodied resonance, which allows for representing another
person’s mental states.
3.3 Some empirical examples of embodied simulation
In this section we will give a few examples of research addressed in the landmark
publication by Niedenthal and colleagues (2005) wherein they distinguish between on-line
and off-line cognition. It is suggested, that on-line cognition “is intimately tied to the relevant
modality-specific processes required to interact with the environment effectively”. In contrast
off-line cognitive activity is characterized as decoupled from the environment and is reliant on
processing in modality-specific systems and bodily states (Niedenthal, 2005, p). This
distinction will turn out to be important in understanding the radical (Heideggerian) version of
embodied cognition. Note that the distinction between on-line and off-line cognition involves
crude concepts that may only have value in contrasting extreme ends of a continuum
(coupled-decoupled).
3.3.1. On-line Social Cognition and PSS
A classic topic in Social Psychology concerning social interactions is that of mimicry
and imitation. It is well established that newborn infants less than 2 hours old can, and often
do imitate others’ facial gestures such as mouth opening, lip or tongue protrusion (Meltzoff &

Running Head: RETHINKING SITUATED & EMBODIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

15

Moore, 1983). Furthermore, in conversations people often come to imitate each other’s speech
characteristics (e.g., latency and rate of speech; Capella & Planalp, 1981) and tend to mimic
other’s emotional facial expressions without explicit awareness (Bush, Barr, McHugo, &
Lanzetta, 1989; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). According to the PSS account bodily
mimicry should facilitate cognitive processing of (emotional) stimuli as well as induce
(emotional) states compatible with these bodily expressions. Indeed, a range of studies show
that participants are more efficient in discerning different types of facial expressions when
they (can) mimic these expressions themselves (e.g., Walbott, 1991; Strack, Martin, &
Stepper, 1988; for an overview see Niedenthal et al., 2010). As such, Niedenthal and
colleagues (2010) suggest that imitation can be understood as an embodied simulation
process, and performing or simulating facial expressions is the source of understanding
others’ facial expressions.
Another range of studies focuses on the role of motor states such as approach and
avoidance in (social) attitude formation. In a now famous study by Cacioppo, Priester, and
Bernston (1993) participants were asked to evaluate unfamiliar Chinese ideographs in terms
of pleasantness whilst performing an arm flexion versus extension action (puling upward or
pushing downward on a table). It was found that participants performing the arm flexion
versus extension action judged the ideographs to be more pleasant. Recently similar effects
were obtained regarding evaluating social impression formation; presenting a set of
photographed faces during arm flexion versus extension increased (decreased) participant’s
evaluation of the faces’ trustworthiness (Slepian, Young, Rule, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2012).
Another line of research in ESP investigates the grounding of abstract
conceptualizations in concrete bodily experiences (Barsalou, 2008). For example, putting
participants in physically warmer conditions makes participants feel psychologically closer to
others (IJzerman & Semin, 2010) and become more trusting during investment games (Kang

Running Head: RETHINKING SITUATED & EMBODIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

16

et al., 2010). Furthermore, the association between physical warmth and feelings of
psychological distance is bi-directional: people judge the ambient temperature to be lower
when psychological distance is greater (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). These findings and
others (Meier, et al., 2012) are often suggested to resonate well with the PSS account in that
social knowledge is constituted in multi-modal representations that involve simulations of
bodily experiences(Barsalou, 1999).
3.3.2 Off-line Social Cognition and PSS
Niedenthal and colleagues (2005) suggest that there is plenty of evidence of PSS
account in off-line social cognitive processes, where there is no direct interaction between
agents. For example, in a study by Vanman, Paul, Ito, and Miller (1997) participants were
asked to imagine individuals whom they might later had to collaborate with on a problemsolving task. It was found that participants were more likely to show positive facial reactions
(measured through EMG) during imagination when they imagined a competent (vs.
incompetent) or ethnically similar (vs. different) individual. In related study by Andersen,
Reznik, and Manzella (1996) it was found that participants that were presented with
supposedly fictional descriptions that were actually descriptions of people they personally
know and felt close to(versus random descriptions) participants tended to produce more
positive facial gestures.
Investigating approach-avoidance embodiments, Förster and Strack (1997, 1998)
demonstrated that motor-actions can facilitate retrieval from memory if the movement is
compatible with the information retrieved. In these studies participants were asked to generate
names of famous people as well as to report on the extent to which they liked the person
named. During the generation of the names participants had to perform an approach (vs.
avoidance) motor-action (muscle flexion vs. extension). In this set-up people were more likely
to generate names of famous people they liked (vs. disliked) when performing the approach
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(avoidance) action. In a similar way Riskind (1984) found that participants’ speed of memory
retrieval of positive (vs. negative) life events was influenced by their posture: positive events
were remembered quicker when participants adopted an erect (vs. slump) body posture and
positive (vs. negative) facial expression.
3.4 Discussion: PSS between embodiment and representationalism
Now that we have given a brief overview of Embodied Simulation with Barsalou’s
PSS account as its representative for ESP we will attempt to relate this to the previous
philosophical reflections. To reiterate, in the previous sections on Cartesian and Heideggerian
insights sketched two general views that underlie thinking in Cognitivism and
Situated/Embodied Cognition, respectively. Situated/Embodied Cognition aims to undermine
central tenets of Cognitivism, most notably the mind as an information processing system
manipulating (sub)symbolic representations, which are virtually decoupled from current states
of the agent’s body or her environment (De Bruin & Kästner, 2011).
The PSS account does not reject representations; social cognition involves the
utilization of a particular kind of represented knowledge. It is thus a Cartesian view, in the
sense that mental structures do enrich the view of the world, adding something to the bare
stimulus. Barsalou and colleagues’ (2009) notion of an agent’s feeling of ‘being there’
requires representations to add meaning to the sensory input. We might be inclined to
understand Barsalou’s ideas of “being there” to resonate well with Heidegger’s Da-Sein
(There-Being), encountering the world in a non-detached way, as ready-to-hand. However,
Barsalou seems to take an entirely different perspective, starting off with an underdetermined
percept that affects the agent’s inner world of Perceptual Symbols. This Perceptual Symbol
System categorizes presence-at-hand facts (categorical inferences) which then reveals through some cognitive gymnastics (Chemero, 2009) - the world as ready-to-hand. This is
played out in situated conceptualization in that we have, say, the perception of a hammer: a

Running Head: RETHINKING SITUATED & EMBODIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

18

visual activation pattern that reaches the threshold of the visual component of the hammersimulator which then opens up the possibilities for actions (affordances) based on reactivations of motor-actions. In normal interaction with the world the PSS account seems to
imply that simulations are always running to understand the situation at hand. As we will see,
radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognition reject this view as it assumes a heavyduty simulation system where none is needed during pragmatic engagement with the
environment (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).
Indeed, Julian Kiverstein (2012) has recently suggested that PSS does not explain, but
rather presupposes a “context of a wider set of skills and practices in virtue of which we know
how to find our way about in the world” (pp.746). Kiverstein’s (2012) analysis contrasts the
conservative (in our scheme, Cartesian) view of embodiment, including Barsalou, with a
Heideggerian view, exemplified by Dreyfus (1972). The conservative view, retains a
computational view of the bodily mechanisms underlying (social) cognition. Drawing on the
Heideggerian tradition, Enactivism sees the experience of “being there”, in a meaningful
world, as grounded in tacit pre-reflexive bodily skills and practices. However, Kieverstein
points out that an account of the sense-making characteristic of our daily being-in-the-world is
absent in the traditional approach; Following Dreyfus’ famous criticism of classical symbolic
AI, he suggests that Perceptual Symbols are just as problematic. Namely, Barsalou
presupposes a meaningless situation that becomes meaningful through systematically
employing world-enriching, albeit sensori-motor, representations. However, PerceptualSymbol-Systems occur against an already present meaningful tacit holistic background of
skills and practices, about which Barsalou has little to say.
One might wonder whether Kiverstein’s criticism of Barsalou is entirely justified. The
point of PSS is that these symbol systems re-enact direct sensory experience and interaction
with the environment, and thereby do connect to the real world. So, whatever the value of
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Kiverstein’s critique of PSS, his analysis brings out once more that the radical Enactivist
account of embodiment should be carefully distinguished from the more conservative and
reformist views of embodiment, retaining representational explanations.
The PSS account seems especially powerful in explaining how knowledge,
particularly the kind of conceptual abilities that human agent possesses, is utilized in
cognitive situations such as imagination, inference of social information (stereotypes), and
thinking of abstract concepts. Furthermore, the PSS avoids the Fodorian symbolic Language
of Thought (Fodor, 1975), as distinct from the information provided by the senses. As such, it
has been suggested that the project of Embodied Simulation is a promising account for reconnecting decoupled cognitive engagement with basic perceptual systems and as such, albeit
indirectly, with the body and the environment (Anderson, Richardson, & Chemero, 2012).
Having said that, we think that the PSS account unduly inserts what is characteristic
for off-line cognition onto on-line cognition (cf. de Bruin & Kästner, 2011). We can see this
in the way Niedenthal and colleagues (2005) identify the role of PSS in on-line cognition. In
the previous sections we have used the term smooth coping to appreciate a particular kind of
on-line cognitive engagement, namely cognition occurring in a real-time interaction with the
environment, and relying on fluid context-specific responses. On-line social cognition, we
would suggest, is paradigmatic in those situations where interactions with others are
actualized. However, most of the social psychological experiments reported in Niedenthal et
al.’s (2005) overview of on-line cognition do not involve rich social interactions. For
example, it is reported that when participants were subliminally presented with pictures of
happy expressions tend to react with slight smiles (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000).
The PSS account would suggest that execution or simulation of the motor-configuration of
smiles aids “social information-processing”. Such explanations are Cartesian in the very sense
that the focus lies on perception, information processing, and representation rather than
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genuine interaction. Consider for example that infants have difficulty to direct their attention
at their mother and even become distressed when watching a video-replay of the mother,
which is not the case for infants that have a direct video-link with their mother (Bigelow,
Maclean, & MacDonald, 1996). From the PSS account, these situations are not easily
distinguishable; in both situations the social environment should trigger simulations that make
the encounter meaningful. Thus, the body has the function of constituting that very
interaction, rather than of maintaining some kind of neural simulation. As such, Niedenthal
and colleagues (2005) one-sidedly narrow the continuum of on-line/off-line cognition by
ignoring the affordances in dynamic social encounters2.
Thus Embodied Simulation as solely an account of sensorimotor bodily processes at
the neural representation level remains dualistic, despite its self-acclaimed synthesis of bodymind (cf. Glenberg, 2006). We can therefore conclude that embodied simulation is to some
extent still an ambiguous, semi-Cartesian notion, when considered from a Heideggerian
perspective.
4. Radical Situated/Embodied Cognition
In this section we will address the approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognition that we
have grouped under the term “radical” (cf. Chemero, 2009; Hutto & Myin, 2013). We will
start with Ecological Psychology (Gibson, 1979; Chemero, 2009). Although almost
exclusively concerned with perception and action, Ecological Psychology provides some
seminal ideas for Situated and Embodied Social Psychology viz. emergent organismenvironment systems, and circular causality. Next, we will discuss insights from Enactive
accounts of social cognition.
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4.1 An Organism-Environment system: Ecological Psychology and beyond
Gibson’s Ecological Psychology (Gibson, 1979; Looren de Jong, 1995) has always been
an outsider in Cognitive Science, but is now increasingly re-considered (e.g., Chemero, 2009;
Reed, 1996). Gibson’s Ecological Psychology can be historically situated in the wider
movement of Naturalism which contends that mental processes must be investigated with
regard to the environment and the organism’s interaction with it (Looren de Jong, 1995).
Gibson (1979) rejected the traditional view of visual perception as the mental
reconstruction of two-dimensional input (light hitting the retina) into a three-dimensional
representation (Chemero, 2009). Rather, perception should be understood as non-inferential,
non-representational and involves the direct pick-up of information in the environment.
Gibson further argued that the function of perception is not information processing but
guidance for action, more precisely the detection of affordances - opportunities for actions.
Affordances are “action-referential properties of the environment that may or may not be
perceived (Michaels, p. 137)”. And action must be understood as “coordinated movements,
guided by information, in the service of some goal” (Michaels, p. 138). Some
ecologists distinguish effectivities from affordances; these are the properties of the animal that
allow an action in an environment, and as such the complement of affordances. An action
requires the mutual compatibility of affordances and effectivities (a flower affords sitting for a
bee, not for a human). Thus, affordances are not solely properties of the environment, nor to
be equated with bodily dispositions, rather they constitute dynamic action-capabilities of an
organism-environment system.
For the Cognitivist approach organism and environment are logically distinct systems
(Richardson et al., 2008; Gibson, 1979). Instead the Ecological approach posits that the
organism and the environment should be studied as one system (an organism-environment
[O-E] system) in which its components are dynamically coupled and constitutively
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interdependent. The behavioral system is taken to be a non-linear dynamical system (Coey,
Varlet, Richardson, 2012). In this system, behavior emerges through reciprocal interactions
between local components of the system and the global behavioral state of the system (Coey
et al., 2012). These emergent patterns of behavior are self-organizing, and do not require
central control and planning by neural representations and programs.
The notion of an O-E system negates the intuitive distinction of perception and action.
As Richardson and colleagues (2003; p. 174) put it: “visual perception entails a pair of eyes,
set apart, in a head that can turn and that is attached to a body that can move from place to
place. Signiﬁcantly, such systems are […] actively engaged in the detection of information”.
Importantly, the notion of an O-E system is crucial for Enactive accounts of perception
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001). In such an account the idea of a dynamically coupled perceptionaction system is taken to its extreme, such that the phenomenal differentiation of the senses
(hearing, seeing etc.) are not to be explained by the physiology of the sense-organs per se, nor
does phenomenal consciousness originate from brain-regions where the inputs of these senseorgans are sent to. Rather, perceiving is something we do, and relies on the laws of sensorimotor contingencies. Phenomenal consciousness arises from sensori-motor know-how that is
specified in lawful patterns that arise out of action and perception: “Thus, visual sensation and
visual perception are different aspects of a person’s skillful exploratory activity (that is,
exploratory activity guided by practical knowledge of the effect movement will have on
nervous influx)” (O’Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 970).
Here we see a similarity with the Heideggerian idea that an agent’s activity in the
environment opens up the possibility of a direct grasp of the world. Affordances are directly
perceived through picking up invariants in the ambient optic array in ongoing action. This is
in line with the Heideggerian notion of ready-to-hand in which the meaning of an entity is
disclosed by the ways it can be used by the agent in the context of ongoing activity. Thus,
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rather than a perception-represent-plan-action sequence, perception and action constitute a
continuous cycle. This puts the ecological tradition close to the Heideggerian notion of
smooth coping.
How to generalize the Ecological perspective to Social Psychology? Consider that the
environment can also be a social environment which makes social affordances possible
(Rietveld, 2012; Marsh et al., 2009). Examples being: A pause in a conversation affords
talking, a friend’s sad face invites comforting, and a lifted hand of a significant other affords a
‘high five’. Another special aspect of the social in Ecological Psychology lies in the
interactive practices it affords. This can be appreciated if we consider that the components of
the O-E system change dynamically and are open to form new couplings with other elements
that then become part of that very system. As such, in dyadic social interaction the
components of two O-E systems become shared and should in effect be treated as one
coordinative structure or an O-O-E system (Riley et al., 2011).
To sum up, ideas from ecological psychology could be considered the launching pad
for a radically embedded and embodied Social Psychology (Marsh et al., 2009). These are:
perception-action cycles, subserving smooth coping, which unfold in an emergent supraindividual system that cannot be reduced to individualist simulation processes. The practical
engagement with the world is the basic mode of intelligent action, disclosing the world for the
agent without the need to invoke mental representations.
4.2 Ecological Psychology in social context: some examples
In this section we discuss research on social behavior broadly within the framework of
Ecological Psychology. We will specifically be focusing on several representative examples
that implies that social interaction should be regarded as a single dynamical unit (Richardson,
et al., 2010).

Running Head: RETHINKING SITUATED & EMBODIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

24

Interpersonal coordination (e.g., swinging one’s arm with another person’s arm)
emerges through coupled oscillator dynamics in which stabilities (in-phase coordination with
another) are unconsciously attained (Richardson, et al., 2010). For example, when subjects are
asked to perform a rhythmic movement task (e.g., swinging in a rocking chair) whilst
watching a co-actor’s movements, they automatically and unconsciously synchronize their
movements with the other (Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2005; see also Schmidt,
Bienvenu, Fitzpatrick, & Amazeen, 1998). This synchronization is dependent on constraints
in the environment. For example, when less visual information of the others movement is
available synchronization is thwarted. Or when speed of swinging is increased participants
shift from out-phase to in-phase. This suggests that social interaction allows synergies
between components of O-E systems that can be modeled as one single dynamical system.
For example, Anderson and colleagues (2012) describe an experiment by Harrison and
Richardson (2009) that investigated how social movement systems form single coherent units.
Participants in this study were paired and instructed to walk or jog one behind the other at a
comfortable pace whilst being connected with a 75 cm long appendage. Interestingly, it was
found that leg movements become coordinated with a preference for quadruped movement
patterns (i.e., pace, trot; coordinated leg movements similarly to animals with four legs).
Anderson and colleagues (2012, p. 8) note that this multi-legged coordination can occur
“without direct neural-muscular coupling but also that the organizational mechanism for
stable interpersonal motor control does not have to be a centralized mental or neural-cognitive
structure”.
More importantly, from the O-O-E system established in social interaction new
“entrained” affordances emerge. For example, Marsh and colleagues (2009) discuss the plankmoving paradigm of Asch (1952) in which participants move planks of various lengths but
can only touch the ends of the plank. Subjects shift between cooperative and solo modes
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relative to body-scaled ratio, thus relative to size of the plank and both individuals’ arm span
(Isenhower et al., 2010; Richardson et al., 2008). Thus individuals are directly attuned to the
other’s action capabilities in relation to their own bodily limitations. Furthermore, when two
individuals had a similar arm span relative to the planks they made similar action-mode
transitions (using one hand vs. two hands to pick up a plank; solo action and cooperative
action). Essentially this entails a new emergent organism-organism-environment system. In an
experiment by Chang, Wade, & Stoffregen (2009) adult-child dyads were asked to judge
passability of an aperture as a couple. It was found that perceivers judged the passability of
the aperture precisely on the basis of the body-scaled information of the dyad as a whole.
Several studies in Social Psychology show that interpersonal coordinated behavior elicits
feelings of one-ness, suggesting entrainment on a phenomenal level (see Marsh et al., 2009).
We should note that, although these social situations entail social cooperation directed at the
environment and not so much interpersonal coping, it does show that social coordination
(which arguably presupposes interpersonal coping) is a highly emergent and dynamic process.
5. Enactivism and Embodied Social Psychology
Enactivism is a view on life and mind (Varela et al., 1991) and has interesting
implications for the way we relate to the social world through our bodies and in the active
engagement with others. Furthermore, Enactivism seems close to the Heideggerian view, and
constitutes something like a theoretical basis for a more Radical Situated/Embodied
Psychology. Recall that according to Cognitivism the basic way we cope with the social
environment relies on attributing, through propositional inferences, a mental state of the other
(e.g., emotions, beliefs, desires). The common phenomenological objection is that such a
theoretical and indirect stance is at odds with everyday intersubjective experience (Gallagher,
2005). One of the arguments against the Cognitivist accounts as Theory Theory or Simulation
Theory is that much of our social experiences have a feel of immediacy (Gallagher, 2005;
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Ratcliffe, 2007). For example a smile is directly perceived as meaningful and may solicit a
range of actions (e.g., smiling back) that at least phenomenally does not unfold through a
multi-step inferential process.
Another problem of the cognitivist’ description is that agents are viewed as ‘voyeurs’;
observing without actively interacting with others (De Bruin, 2010). Setting up social
cognition in a voyeuristic situation increases the need to employ inferential processes or
simulation processes that impose social meaning on supposed undetermined social stimuli.
Instead, Ratcliffe (2007) argues that if we take the personal and interactive nature of social
encounters seriously it leaves much room for the dynamic bodily engagements which
constitute intersubjective experience. As Rietveld (2012) puts it in an phenomenological
analysis of social affordances, these are solicited by the environment without “goal
representation or pre-existing sense of what is adequate in advance of our performance in a
particular situation” (Rietveld, 2012, p. 25). Imagine for example an emotion-laden
conversation with a friend. The fluidity in which facial expressions are picked up, the
transitions of speech emerging automatically, suggests that at the phenomenal level
conceptual recognition of others’ beliefs, emotions, desires or intentional states are absent
(Gallagher, 2005; see also Gallagher & Varga, 2013 for an account of direct perception and
other social psychological phenomena). It is precisely because this experience in active social
interactions is not accounted for in Cognitivism that the body’s expressiveness of others
subjective experience is overlooked. As such phenomenologists insist that we interact with
others as bodily subjects, in which mind and body of others are perceived as integrated wholes
as opposed to the body occluding the content of the mind – the notorious “other minds”
problem (see Section 2). In contrast in the traditional theories of mind-reading the focus is on
passive social perception, with extra-perceptual inferences soliciting action. Thus the
important point we can take home is that the “spectatorial” picture offered by Cognitivism
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does not fit the phenomenology of everyday social interactions (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007;
De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010).
What then is social interaction more than social perception? Social perception is
passive and temporally impoverished one-way lane; picking up social stimuli which are then
further processed independently from the body and the environment. Social interaction is a
temporally rich, dynamic and drawn out affair. An analogy being drawing: “One draws,
responds to what one has drawn, draws more, and so on. […] making the whole development
a mutual affair rather than a matter of one-way determinism” (Bredo, 1994, p.28). For De
Jaegher & Di Paulo (2007) to do justice to this temporally rich interaction and what it means
for social cognition new concepts are needed. In their Enactive approach (Varela et al., 1991)
the notions autonomy and sense-making are introduced to understand life and cognition in
general (cf. Thompson, 2010), and these notions can be extended into the social interactive
domain as participatory sense-making.
According to the Enactivism in order to count as a living organism, a system must
have autonomy. Autonomy means that the agent has the self-generating capacity to maintain
her identity. Importantly the organism’s exertion of autonomy is partly constituted by the
dynamical emergence of novel forms of identity (e.g., integrated sensorimotor engagements
as emerging from neural, bodily and environmental dynamics; De Jaegher, Di Paulo, 2007, p.
3). An autonomous cognitive system inherently depends on exchanges with the world, which
involves the creation of meaning or sense-making. As such information from the environment
is not passively received or enriched with meaning through internal representations. Rather
sense-making, involves enacting or “bringing forth” a world, a process grounded in the
biological organization of the organism (Varela et al.,, 1991). Much like affordances and
effectivities, sense-making is the outcome of the encounter between a “questioning” agent
with a particular “responding” segment of the world (De Jaegher & Di Paulo, 2007, p. 5). The
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process of sense-making is thus the outcome of lawful variations which occur during such
active (social) encounters. De Jaegher & Di Paulo (2007) understand social interaction as
participatory sense-making which refers to the “coordination of intentional activity in
interaction, affecting individual sense-making processes which provide new domains of social
sense-making which were initially not available to the individual” (De Jaegher & Di Paulo,
2007, p. 13). Importantly, for a coordination to be social it must involve an agent that sustains
the encounter by maintaining patterns of coordination and whilst at same time remaining
autonomous as an interactor. Thus in elaboration to the notion of an O-O-E system it is
suggested that although a social system can enjoy unity it can only be sustained when both
individuals participate in this unity. A straightforward implication of this claim is that when
coordination between two individuals is controlled by only one individual, the system ceases
to be social (e.g., in violent situations).
5.1 Enactivism as a Research Program
Arguably, the Enactivist’ research program for social cognition is still underdeveloped
compared with Embodied Simulation. It has put forward some potentially innovative
proposals (e.g., Neurophenomenology; Varela et al., 1991; ch. 6; Colombetti, 2013; Gallagher,
2005) but these await wider implementation. Studies on social cognition that have been
conducted explicitly under the Enactivist banner involve modeling studies (e.g., Froese & Di
Paolo, 2010) and experimental research (e.g., Auvray, Lenay, & Stewart, 2009) that focus on
the cognitive consequences of social interaction (for experimental results and overviews
congenial with Enactivism see e.g., Barhami et al.2010; Fusaroli, Rączaszek-Leonardi, &
Tylén, 2014; Schilbach et al., 2013). For example, Auvray and collegeaus (2009) employed a
paradigm wherein blind-folded dyads need to detect each other’s presence in a virtual space
through tactile perception. It was shown that the way dyads detect social presence in this task
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could not be explained by individual information processing alone, but is rather explained by
movement dynamics that are expressed on a dyadic level (for details see Auvray et al., 2009).
5.2. Second-person versus Third person: a paradigm change
Overgaard and Michael (2013) recently voiced a critique to social interactionism, and
questioned whether it contributes much to the explanation of social cognition, either by
providing a new kind of explanation, or by changing the explanandum. They claim that
interactionism in so far as it is anywhere plausible, is already compatible with existing
research, and interaction does not replace individual mental processes that traditional research
focuses on. However, in our opinion, replacing the classical notion of mindreading by
interaction amounts to a paradigm change. Overgaard and Michael couched their analysis in
representationalist language; they construe social cognition as attributing mental states to
another person (p.3), mindreading is understanding others as having mental states of various
sorts (p. 2), et cetera. Obviously, the domain of investigation is defined here in individualist,
representationalist terms. The social cogniser has a “detached” “spectatorial” third- person
attitude towards another agent. In contrast a genuine interactionist “second-person”
(Gallagher, 2008) approach involves an irreducibly collective mode, a new dynamic emergent
pattern extended in time. This is not so much a change in explanandum, as a new way of
looking at social cognition, a paradigm change. Instead of mindreading in the sense of
inferring or simulating cognitive and emotional states in the other’s mind, we seesmooth
coping in a new emergent dyadic interactive system, without explicit deliberative thought.
When Overgaard and Michael demand (p. 8): ”an account is needed how interaction
contributes to mindreading” (italics in original), the answer might be that social cognition is
not about mindreading (at least not in social interaction).
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6. Final discussion
We discussed how Cartesian and Heideggerian philosophical ideas fit with, and aid in
the contrast of, radical Situated/Embodied approaches and the more conservative Embodied
Simulation account popular in Social Psychology today. Next we provide a very brief
summary of our analysis and its implication for Social Psychology, as to conclude with
possible directions for integration of the frameworks presented here.
We have argued that Ecological Psychology and Enactivism are an important
extension of the Heideggerian framework. In particular, they provide an account of the
temporally extended, interactive unfolding of social cognition. Through embodied know-how,
unfolding in ongoing social interaction, we gain a more direct and non-inferential access to
the (social) world; the social world as ready-to-hand. Across the radical Situated/Embodied
perspectives it is held that the study of social cognition requires a system-level (dyadic)
approach.
It is precisely in the interactive context where we have questioned the scope of
simulation processes as employed in Barsalou’s PSS account. Social Psychology might be
hampered by this semi-Cartesian framework, in that the role of actual real-time embodiment
is downplayed when ignoring the temporal richness of dynamic social interaction (see section
3). Thus the choice of its explananda are narrowed to (internal) representational states of mind
(neural sensori-motor simulations) and the social situation is intellectually construed (as social
cognition as individual mental representation), at the expense of successfully accounting for
phenomena in dyadic smooth interaction.
Notwithstanding the valuable lesson for Social Psychology to reincorporate smooth
dyadic interaction into its explananda, we are currently left with a problematic dualism that
hampers development of a more unified Situated/Embodied Social Psychology. That is, a
strict division between off-line (decoupled) and on-line (coupled) social cognition (de Bruin
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& Kästner, 2011). When exclusively focusing on ‘embodied social know-how’ radical
Situated/Embodied Cognition runs in danger to explain away capabilities that are employed in
the absence of rich information made available in dynamic social interaction. To date most if
not all accounts of social cognitive phenomena are susceptible to some extent to a dogmatic
overemphasis of either coupled or decoupled cognitive engagements (De Bruin & Kästner,
2012). The task of working out a coherent and plausible intermediate position, integrating
both perspectives is a daunting one, and we can only suggest some directions.
Integrating Cartesian and Heideggerian approaches? Some possible directions
The embodied simulation account and more radical situated/embodied approaches
such as Enactivism seem to address different segments of the full gamut of social cognition.
Before any attempt can be made to integrate these perspectives, we should appreciate that
these frameworks are not simply complementary. Within the Heideggerian framework,
smooth coping is the primary epistemic mode, internal representations are secondary. We
think a proper study of the social mind should start with investigating it in its natural and
ontogenetically primary situation, namely a situated and embodied context. Higher-order
forms of cognition are derived, in a bottom-up fashion, by incorporating the linguistically
mediated and cultural scaffolding that enable representation, abstraction, and complex
recoding (cf. Clark, 2008). As such Barsalou’s embodied simulation in its current form seems
to lack the proper founding or “grounding” in natural and ontogenetic primary situations.
Hutto and Myin (2013) expressly address the radical variety of Enactivism, replacing
the view of mind as a container of mental representations (mental content) by a view of mind
as capabilities. For basic cognition no mental content is needed, just adaptive flexibility in
coping with the world. Presumably, for forms of higher order cognition, including explicit
theorizing on other people’s beliefs and intentions, mental content may be a useful
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explanation. Hutto and Myin (2013) recognize a “scaffolded” mind, as a kind of language
mediated superstructure on basic enactive cognition.
Although Hutto and Myin (2013) do not give a satisfactory explanation of the nature
of non-basic cognition, we think there are currently several interesting perspectives that might
aid in the development thereof (e.g., Clark, 2008; Fusaroli, Gangopadhyay, & Tylén, 2013).
Such accounts posit that ‘languaging’ consists of actively using material symbols, that is,
external props with particular physical qualities that augment basic cognition. These accounts
expressly incorporate the role of dynamic emergence of cultural practices, the use of external
tools and props (including language), and how this offers the human agent means for
decoupling and internalization. Interestingly, some of these accounts that fit in this line of
thought do incorporate mechanisms akin to Barsalou’s sensori-motor simulation (Borghi &
Binkofski, 2014).
In closing, let us consider the following promising statement by Barsalou: “One
prediction is that cognitive science will increasingly witness the integration of three major
perspectives—classic symbolic architectures, statistical ⁄ dynamical systems, and grounded
cognition—with competition between them decreasing (Barsalou, 2010, p 720)”. We agree
and to this end we have attempted to broaden the discourse in ESP by introducing radical
competitors of Situated/Embodied Cognition to ESP and provided an overview of how such a
competition might look like and what it implicates for theory and research in the field.
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